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21  Introduction
Oil and gas exporting countries are routinely advised to diversify their economies away from 
hydrocarbons and raw materials. Even though necessary due to the finite nature of 
hydrocarbon resources, diversification was not perceived as a priority by many in an 
environment of very high oil prices over the past two decades. However, the dynamic has 
changed since then with a spectacular drop in oil prices in July 2014 followed by a prolonged 
period of cheap oil. There is a renewed interest in the diversification agenda in oil and gas 
exporting countries. For example, in April 2016 the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman unveiled the ‘National Transformation Plan’ to diversify the Saudi economy and 
significantly increase the share of non-oil revenue of the government. Similar initiatives are 
also observed in Nigeria with the Nigerian Minister of Finance, Mrs. Kemi Adeosun, recently 
revealing the government’s plan to jump start diversified growth.  
Despite its popularity as a policy recommendation, surprisingly little is known about 
the merits of economic diversification in resource-rich countries (Wiig and Kolstad, 2012; 
Ahmadov, 2014). At least in theory diversification could deliver the following benefits. First, 
diversification could act as a buffer against commodity price volatility. Note that volatility is 
particularly disruptive for oil rich countries through its unanticipated impact on the sovereign 
balance sheet even in the presence of clearly defined fiscal rules. Furthermore, the risks from 
volatility gets magnified many fold in the absence of clearly defined fiscal rules. Second, 
diversification could also create new jobs in the non-resource sector of the economy. It could 
bring new skills and technology to the economy with long term benefits. Finally, 
diversification could also act as a buffer against a broader “resource curse.” 3 However, it 
remains difficult to identify where and when petroleum rich states have successfully 
diversified and which policy interventions worked effectively. It is unclear how to measure 
3 See, for example, Auty (2001); Lipschitz (2011); Conceição et al. (2011); Lederman and Maloney 
(2003, 2012); and Collier and Page (2009). 
3diversification success or failure.  In the absence of a more fine-grained analysis of reliable 
diversification measures, analysts commonly fall back on a handful of examples of countries 
that appear to have been successful. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia are often presented 
as success stories even though it is not obvious that they are useful examples for other 
countries. 
In this paper we review recent studies of diversification in oil-exporting states.4 We 
suggest that our understanding of this issue has been limited by three problems. First, the data 
used by some of the existing studies appear to be incomplete and inconsistent. For example, 
studies addressing the issue of diversification at different stages of development5 tend to 
focus mainly on exports data from the World Trade Organization (WTO). The coverage of 
petroleum rich developing countries in these datasets is patchy. Some studies utilize 
employment data from the International Labor Organization (ILO) but these datasets 
typically have very weak coverage both in time series and cross-sectional dimensions. Note 
that we discuss data challenges in section 3 and present several illustrative plots. 
Furthermore, sectoral GDP data is very much restricted to OECD member countries 
significantly limiting the scope of analysis. In particular, important questions such as the 
impact of petroleum resources on the sectoral composition of GDP in developing countries 
remain largely beyond reach. Second, some studies such as Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and 
Cadot et al. (2011) use export concentration measures. These measures are innovative but 
they are potentially noisy and uninformative for oil exporting developing countries due to 
weak data coverage. Either complete lack of coverage or missing observations appear to be 
the norm when it comes to disaggregated exports data from developing countries. Finally, 
causal identification remains a major challenge in this literature. The structure of the 
4 We do not attempt to summarize the broader literature on trade diversification, income, and 
development.  On diversification and income, see Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Koren and Tenreyro (2007), 
Cadot et al. (2011). On diversification and economic development, see Hirschman (1958), Hidalgo (2012) and 
Rodrik (2013).  For a recent survey, see Cadot et al. (2013). 
5 See Cadot et al. (2013) for a survey of this literature. 
4economy could be driving the volume of oil exported by these countries. A diversified 
economy would generate greater domestic demand for oil leading to fewer volumes exported 
abroad. Therefore, causation could run from the structure of the economy to petroleum 
exports rather than in the other direction as is typically assumed.   
To gain a clearer picture on the challenges faced by the oil-exporting countries we 
offer a description of the diversification pathways of the world’s 35 oil exporters. We track 
changes in their non-oil export shares over the period 1962 to 2012 sourced from the World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) of the World Bank and UN Comtrade database of the 
United Nations. Fluctuations in the non-oil export price relative to the price of all other 
exports could contaminate the time series variation of these shares. Therefore, in order to 
remove the effects of oil price fluctuations we express both non-oil and total exports in US 
dollars year 2000 constant prices. In addition, we also track changes in non-oil private sector 
employment as a share of total employment. The latter is sourced from the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and covers the period 1969 to 2008. Consistent with recent efforts 
to explain sustained periods of economic performance (Hausmann et al. 2005, Freund and 
Pierola 2012), we look at diversification over 10 year periods and offer summary statistics of 
these diversification spells. The shares fail provide a holistic picture of the nature of 
diversification across the entire economy. Therefore, we also plot Gini coefficient based 
measures of diversification which takes account of the diversity across multiple sectors 
within the economy. Finally, as a step toward identifying policy successes and failures, we 
plot changes in the non-oil exports share with several macroeconomic policy and institutions 
variables. We also employ a simple regression model that correlates non-oil exports and 
employment with resource rent and geography and comment on the room for policy 
maneuvers.  
We find diverse patterns in the data when it comes to diversification. The Middle East 
5and North African (MENA) countries register a steady increase in the share of non-oil 
exports post globalization whereas former USSR countries witness a decline in industrial 
capacity. The post globalization experience of the majority of the oil exporting high income 
countries does not appear to be positive in terms of non-oil exports share. Same applies to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the trend in East Asia and Central America appears to be 
positive.  
According to our data on the relative size of non-oil employment in the private sector, 
larger countries exhibit more internally diversified (in terms of employment) structure than 
their export share data show.  
Finally, we find strong negative correlation between change in non-oil export share 
and oil rent per capita but weak correlation between the former and variables such as real 
exchange rate and political institutions over the period 2000 to 2012. In a regression model, 
we also find strong negative correlation between oil rent and diversification after controlling 
for country specific unobserved heterogeneity such as geography, country specific trends 
such as culture and demographic factors, time varying global shocks, and cross-sectional 
dependence. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section reviews recent 
scholarship on the consequences of “oil dependence” – meaning a specialization in petroleum 
exports – as well as its causes. Section 3 describes how these studies have been limited by the 
problems of data, measurement, and causal identification. To this end we also present 
illustrative plots to highlight data challenges. Section 4 contains our analysis of 
diversification trends in the oil exporting states, and section 5 outlines a research agenda that 
could help scholars address some of the problems. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Causes and Consequences of Oil Export Dependence: A Review
A large literature deals with commodity boom and their socioeconomic consequences. This 
6body of work is commonly known as the “resource curse literature.”6 Even though related, 
here we place most of that literature aside. Instead we focus on the narrower question of the 
causes and consequences of a specialization in oil exports.7  Furthermore, in section 3 we also 
explain why it is challenging to causally identify relationships between oil dependence and 
other factors. But here we concentrate our attention on the existing studies that have 
attempted to address the question of oil specialization. 
What are the effects of oil dependence? 
Studies of the consequences of oil dependence can be divided into three categories: those that 
focus on volatility, those that focus on crowding out, and those that focus on broader effects 
on institutional quality, government accountability, and violent conflict. It is also noteworthy 
that the volatility, crowding out and institutions effects are often interlinked. 
Perhaps the most carefully-studied result of oil dependence is macroeconomic 
volatility.  The more concentrated the export sector, and the larger the export sector relative 
to the domestic economy (characterized by consumption, investment and government 
demand), the greater the economy’s exposure to international price shocks.8 Commodities in 
general and oil and gas in particular tend to have volatile prices. This is not only due to 
abrupt shifts in the forces of demand and supply in the physical market but also movements 
in the financial markets of futures and options. A large literature explores the determinants of 
commodity price volatility (Yang et al., 2005). Some argue that the introduction of hedging 
in the form of futures trading reduces volatility in the cash price of commodities (Kamara, 
1982). Other more recent studies indicate that commodity price volatility is positively related 
6 For a review of the resource curse literature, see van der Ploeg (2011), Frankel (2012), and Venables 
(2016). 
7 We use the term “oil dependence” below to denote a specialization in the export of crude oil, refined 
oil products, and natural gas. 
8 Busch (2011) notes that estimates of the causal effects of export concentration on volatility may be 
biased by endogeneity. It develops an instrument for export concentration, based on country geographic 
characteristics, and finds instrumented export concentration is correlated with terms of trade volatility and 
export growth volatility but has no clear association with exchange rate volatility. 
7to the volume of futures trading (Adrangi and Chatrath, 1998). Note that the futures market in 
oil and gas is many times the size of the physical market. Yang et al. (2005) presents a review 
of this literature. Irrespective of the source of volatility, a specialization in oil and gas – if left 
unmitigated by policies or institutions – often leads to macroeconomic volatility.9
Several studies report that resource-based volatility tends to deter investment, which 
in turn may lead to reduced economic growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995, Blattman et al. 2007, 
Aghion et al. 2009)10 and increased inequality (Bhattacharyya and Williamson, 2016). 
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2009) decompose natural resource dependence into a direct 
economic effect, which they report is positive, and an indirect economic effect through its 
effect on volatility, which they find is negative and much larger.  Cavalcanti et al. (2015) 
looks at the relationship between commodity terms of trade volatility and growth and reports 
a similar finding. Lederman and Maloney (2012), however, find a strong correlation between 
extractive exports and terms-of-trade volatility but no robust link to growth volatility.11
Resource-based volatility may also have consequences for governance and public 
service provision. Oil, gas, and mineral wealth tend to generate significant government 
revenues, typically out of proportion to their share of GDP (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; 
Arezki et al., 2014). Price shocks in the resource sector hence tend to have large effects on 
government revenues and modernization of public services.  How these affect governance 
depends, in part, on the government’s ability to stabilize its revenue flows through other 
means, like the use of stabilization funds or hedging instruments such as access to 
international capital markets. At a minimum, revenue volatility places greater demands on the 
9 Jacks et al. (2011) show that commodity prices have been more volatile than the prices for services 
and manufactured goods since at least the 1700s.  On contemporary oil prices and volatility, see Kilian (2008), 
Regnier (2007), and Hamilton (2009). 
10 See the review of earlier studies in Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2009).  For older versions of this 
argument, see Nurske (1958) and Levin (1960).   
11 On the relationship between export concentration and income in a broader set of countries – i.e., both 
resource dependent and non-resource dependent – see Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Koren and Tenreyro (2007), 
and Cadot et al. (2011).  All report a U-shaped relationship between export concentration and income, but make 
no strong claims about causality. 
8government’s fiscal policies. More broadly, revenue instability may help explain why oil 
wealth has been linked in many studies to higher levels of corruption (Arezki and Bruckner 
2011, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013, Caselli and Michaels 2013), particularly in 
autocracies (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010). 
A second consequence of specialization in hydrocarbon exports is the potential 
crowding out of other tradable sectors of the economy through the “Dutch Disease” 
mechanism. The mechanism stipulates that a hydrocarbon export boom would lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate damaging competitiveness of other tradable sectors of 
the economy such as manufacturing and agriculture (Corden and Neary 1982). A resource 
boom would also trigger structural change with rapid resource (capital and labor) reallocation 
away from manufacturing towards non-tradable services. Hence an expansion in extractive 
industries (or positive price shock) in a country with a diversified export portfolio should lead 
to resource dependence through both a direct channel (an increase in the value of resource 
exports) and an indirect channel (a decline in the value of non-resource exports).  These 
crowding-out effects could be large. Harding and Venables (2016), for example, find that for 
each additional dollar of resource revenues, countries tend to see a decrease in non-resource 
exports of 75 cents.12
The crowding out of manufacturing may be undesirable for the long term health of an 
economy. Manufacturing could generates significant positive externalities, such as from 
learning-by-doing (Krugman, 1987). Learning-by-doing aids and abets human capital 
accumulation and long run economic growth. Rodrik (2013) reports that manufacturing 
industries tend to converge across countries in their labor productivity, which implies that 
having a large manufacturing sector will help low-income countries grow more rapidly.  
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) argue that trade openness leads resource-rich countries to 
12 It is unclear whether the Dutch Disease reduces economic growth; the meta-analysis by Magud and 
Sosa (2010) finds little convincing evidence of a growth-reducing effect. Matsen and Torvik (2005) argue there 
may be an optimal degree of Dutch Disease. 
9specialize in raw material exports, which in turn limits their incentives to diversify into 
exports of high valued products such as manufacturing. Furthermore, this also limits the 
country’s ability to undergo structural change from raw materials to industry to services.
Export-oriented manufacturing may also have consequences for gender equity. 
Sectors differ in their propensity to absorb female labor. For example, in the United States 
textile manufacturing is the most female labor intensive sector (Do et al., 2016, Table 1).  In 
many other countries, too, manufacturing has played an important role in drawing women 
into the workforce. For example, Morocco’s textile industry accounted for three-quarters of 
the growth in female employment in the 1990s (Assaad, 2004).  Ozler (2000) and Baslevent 
and Onaran (2004) find that export-oriented factories in Turkey are more likely to employ 
women than firms that produce similar goods for the domestic market.13
Ross (2008) argues that since oil wealth tends to crowd out export-oriented 
manufacturing, it could also crowd women out of the labor force under certain conditions. 
The most important condition could be the inability of women to work in the non-tradable 
sector. In other words, a resource boom would crowd women out of the labor force only if 
they are not able to move into the service sector, which tends to expand with resource booms.  
The paper also argues that oil windfalls can deter women from joining the labor force by 
boosting government transfers to families, which can reduce the opportunity cost of female 
non-participation in the labor force. The reduced presence of women in the labor force also 
impedes the development of their economic and political rights.14 Similarly, Do et al. (2016) 
find that countries with a comparative advantage in goods that are intensive in female labor 
(like manufacturing) exhibit more rapid decline in fertility rates.  
Finally, oil dependence has been statistically associated with a wide range of 
13 For the case of Tunisia, see White (2001); for the case of South Korea, see Park (1993), World Bank 
(2005).  For the case of the US in the 19th century, see Smuts (1959).  
14 Social theorists have long suggested that joining the labor force has a transformative effect on 
women’s lives; one early proponent was Engels [1884] 1978.  Many recent studies support this claim; see, for 
example, Brewster and Rindfuss (2000). 
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undesirable political outcomes, including more durable authoritarian governments, higher 
corruption rates, and under certain conditions, the outbreak of separatist violence (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004, Miguel et al., 2004)15.  While volatility and crowding out are specifically 
linked to a specialization in oil exports, we explain below that it is more difficult to draw 
strong causal links between policy, oil dependence per se and these outcomes. 
What are the causes of oil export dependence? 
Before we embark on examining the causal link between policy, oil dependence and 
outcomes, it is perhaps worthwhile spending some time exploring the following question. 
What are the causes of oil export dependence in the first place? To a first approximation, a 
specialization in oil exports is a simple result of factor endowments. For instance, in a classic 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries with a relative abundance of natural resources will 
specialize in their export. Once established, this specialization can become self-perpetuating 
for three reasons.  The first is the Dutch Disease, through which oil windfalls can reduce 
competitiveness of other tradable goods.  Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) suggest a second 
mechanism, showing how a country that specializes in resource exports will experience 
greater volatility, which can deter investment in other types of tradable goods and hence 
perpetuate the dependence on resource sector exports. Finally, oil might be uniquely hard to 
diversify from because there are few other products that require similar skills. Hence the 
learning-by-doing that occurs in the oil sector tends to generate little entrepreneurship, or 
employment, in other industries.  Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2014) suggests 
that countries diversify by moving from products they specialize in to others that require 
similar capabilities and hence occupy an adjacent “product space.”  To measure the location 
of products it develops a “complexity” index that captures both the export diversity of the 
countries that produce it, and the number of countries that export it.  The complexity index is 
15 These cross-country findings are not corroborated by more recent studies using disaggregated 
geocoded data on resource discovery and conflict. See, for example, Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Arezki et al. 
(2015). 
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designed to indicate how easy or difficult it is for countries that specialize in a given export to 
diversify into other categories of exports.  Crude oil has by far the lowest rating of all 
products, followed by tin ores and cotton (p. 25).  Of all categories of products, they find oil 
production shares the fewest characteristics with other products and inhabits the most isolated 
sector of the “product space,” making it the single most difficult category of goods to 
diversify from.16
Beyond this framework – that oil specialization is initially the result of factor 
endowments, and then becomes self-perpetuating – the degree of oil dependence may be 
affected by a large number of other factors, including policies and institutions. Oil 
dependence is typically measured as oil exports as a share of total exports. The value of oil 
exports will be affected by both global factors, such as price shocks, and domestic factors, 
such as policies and institutions that influence the investment climate.  
Some country characteristics may have different effects on oil investments and non-
oil investments. The former tend to be highly-specific and can operate in protected 
geographic enclaves whereas the latter tend to be more mobile and more susceptible to 
changing labor market conditions. For example, when countries experience political 
instability or violent conflict, investment in manufacturing may flee to other countries while 
investment in oil, gas, and mining may remain, leading to heightened dependence on oil 
exports. A recent study of foreign direct investment in the Middle East and North Africa 
between 2003 and 2012 found that political instability had little effect on investment flows 
into natural resource sectors, but significantly reduced investment flows into non-resource 
sectors (Burger et al., 2016). 
Several studies have looked at whether selected variables are associated with export 
concentration in a regression model. Using a cross-section dataset of 65 resource rich 
16 This argument is consistent with the findings of both Ahmadov (2014) and Lederman and Maloney 
(2012) that among primary commodities, oil is most strongly correlated with export concentration. 
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developing countries, Ahmadov (2014) estimates the effects of a series of variables averaged 
over the period 1960-2000 on export concentration in the 2001-2010 period. The study 
instruments for two potentially endogenous variables, trade integration and institutional 
quality. It reports that diversification is inhibited by autocratic institutions, weak rule of law, 
landlocked or mountainous terrain, and a location in the Middle East or Africa. Oil wealth is 
also associated with less diversification, while an abundance of non-fuel minerals, coal, and 
forest resources is associated with greater export diversity. 
Starosta de Waldemar (2010), using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation approach and a sample of more than 130 countries between 1995 and 2007, 
reports that measures of both perceived corruption and autocratic institutions are also 
associated with less diversification at the product level, and the export of fewer products.  
They argue that rent-seeking discourages innovation by creating uncertainty about future 
returns, and leading to the misallocation of credit. 
Freund and Pierola (2012) asks a closely related question: what explains surges in 
manufacturing exports, where surges are defined as significant increases that are sustained for 
at least seven years? They report that among developing countries, export surges are preceded 
by depreciations in the real exchange rate that are both large and leave the exchange rate 
significantly undervalued – a finding that underscores the challenges caused by the Dutch 
Disease. 
Policies to mitigate oil dependence 
The policy recommendations designed to mitigate oil/minerals dependence are not strongly 
based on evidence. This is perhaps partly explained by the lack of data and the challenges 
associated with quantifying economic policy differences across nations. The policy literature 
mainly focuses on the following three themes. First, they argue that it is important for 
hydrocarbon rich nations to get the economic fundamentals in order (Gelb, 1988; Sachs, 
13
2006; Diop et al., 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 2014; Cherif et al., 2016). The argument runs 
as follows. Petroleum rich countries run the risk of an overvalued exchange rates which 
places large costs on firms in terms of hiring and firing of workers. Overvalued exchange rate 
also undermines the competitiveness of the non-resource tradable sector often stunting 
structural change and economic development. Furthermore, lack of fiscal and monetary 
discipline coupled with an overvalued exchange rate could unleash huge inflationary pressure 
undermining price stability and the prospect of long term investments in manufacturing. 
Therefore, the net outcome often is an economy over reliant on cheap credit funded 
consumption and government expenditure during boom time as opposed to investments and 
exports. History teaches us that this gets easily reversed in the event of a negative price 
shock. In contrast, good policy would be for petroleum rich developing countries to exercise 
fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy. Tight monetary policy characterized by positive 
real interest rate (approximately around 2-3 percent) and fiscal discipline would ensure long 
term price stability by squeezing inflation out of the system and steer the economy away from 
consumption and government expenditure dependency towards investments and exports.  
Second, the policy literature also recommends investments in human capital and 
infrastructure (Sachs, 2006; Collier and Page, 2009; Lederman and Maloney, 2012). This is 
somewhat linked to the first prescription on maintaining a prudent macroeconomic policy. A 
prudent macroeconomic policy delivers effective demand management and long term price 
stability. However, price stability is also dependent on the supply side in the form of 
economic growth. Therefore there is a strong case for utilizing savings generated from god 
macroeconomic policy into investments in factors of production that exhibit increasing 
returns to scale. Investments in human capital and infrastructure are obviously strong 
candidates to create incentives for long term growth. Even though there is very little 
disagreement on the merits of good schooling and infrastructure, there is hardly any 
14
consensus on how to actually achieve this goal. Some studies argue in favor of more active 
state involvement (Sachs, 2006) whereas others recommend innovative management models 
such as public private partnerships (Collier and Page, 2009). 
Finally, the policy literature also notes that it is important for petroleum rich countries 
to provide incentives for non-resource industries to further improve the prospects of long 
term sustainable growth (Collier and Page, 2009; Cherif et al., 2016). Some of the key policy 
prescriptions are improving the business climate through tax reforms, promotion of e-
governance by substantially reducing legal and administrative costs on small businesses, 
providing assistance with accounting through sophisticated use of the banking sector, and 
identifying fast growing export oriented firms in the non-resource sector and providing export 
subsidy for them (Sachs, 2006; Cherif et al., 2016). 
Overall, it is worthwhile noting that there is little disagreement about the value of the 
first and second policy prescriptions, but considerable disagreement remains over how far 
governments should go on the third. For example, Warner (2015) observes that “Public 
capital accumulation is not the only possible antidote for forces pulling in the direction of a 
curse, but it may be the most often recommended.”  In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Collier 
(2014) documents that resource rich countries systematically underinvest in public capital 
and van de Ploeg and Venables (2011) refer to the need for capital accumulation as "the 
fundamental economic problem faced by resource rich economies." Furthermore, it also 
remains unclear how the state could pick winners efficiently in the non-resource sector and 
support them with export subsidy. To what extent these firms are independent of the resource 
sector is an open question and identifying them using an objective strategy could be 
extremely challenging.   
3 Understanding Diversification: Limitations and Challenges
For all the importance of export diversification, why do we know so little about it?  Scholars 
15
working on this topic face three formidable challenges. 
The first is missing or unreliable data. Majority of studies dealing with the issue of 
economic diversification use data from the WTO or the ILO or the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO). Data from the WTO is used to compute measures of 
export diversification whereas the other two sources provide data on overall employment, 
manufacturing value added, and manufacturing employment. All of these sources provide 
data of varying quality and some are obviously better than the others. However, what appears 
to be a common problem is their lack of coverage of petroleum rich developing countries. 
Both time series and spatial coverage of these locations are weak. Datasets are often riddled 
with missing values in addition to the problem of reliability.  
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrates this problem by plotting the number of missing values 
per country against that countries log resource rent per capita. A positive pattern is apparent 
from the plot in both the oil sample and the full sample indicating that countries with high 
levels of resource rent are those with more missing values.  
The second is that export diversification is often measured in ways that are noisy or 
uninformative for oil exporters. Export diversification is generally measured as export shares 
(e.g., Imbs and Wacziarg 2003, Cadot et al. 2011). Similarly, natural resource or petroleum 
dependence is measured as a fraction of total exports, or as a fraction of GDP (e.g., Ahmadov 
2014). As is apparent in figure 3, countries dependent on a single commodity such as oil with 
volatile prices are likely to witness the oil share of their exports rise and fall with global 
prices as the quantity of oil production adjusts. This however reveals very little about the 
structure of production and exports in these economies.  
Even the more sophisticated measure of “economic complexity” developed in 
Hausmann et al. (2014) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) seems to show price-driven fluctuations in 
the oil exporters. States that are highly oil-dependent, like Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Oman, 
16
and Libya, showed spectacular increases in their economic “complexity” between 1978 and 
1988, a time when oil prices collapsed. During the next oil price boom, between 1998 and 
2008, their complexity scores once again plummeted. This pattern albeit at a muted level is 
also observed for all OPEC countries in figure 4.  
A third challenge in this literature is reverse causality in general and establishing 
causality in particular. We note above that oil dependence may be affected by a wide range of 
policies, institutions, and shocks, some of which may be difficult to model. These policies 
and institutions could change either simultaneously with the composition of exports or could 
also be influenced by the variety of exports. Therefore, establishing causality becomes 
extremely challenging. Scholars can partially address this problem by using potentially 
exogenous instruments, like giant or supergiant oil field discoveries (Arezki et al., 2014; Lei 
and Michaels, 2014; Alsharif and Bhattacharyya, 2016), favorable geology (Cotet and Tsui, 
2013), or price shocks caused by out-of-area natural disasters (Ramsay, 2011). But 
instrumental variables may be of limited use here as the instruments could also be directly 
correlated with some of the outcome variables violating the exclusion restrictions.  
4 Oil and Diversification: Documenting Stylized Facts
So far we have documented that the literature on diversification is often plagued by data 
limitations. In particular, both exports and employment data used to compute diversification 
measures lack both spatial and time series coverage. Furthermore, some of the diversification 
measures are contaminated by price movements reflecting pseudo diversification rather than 
genuine change in the structure of the economy. In this section, we make an attempt to 
document some patterns in the data after accounting for challenges such as rapid movements 
in petroleum price.  
First we begin by plotting non-oil exports as a share of total exports in 35 oil 
exporting countries over the period 1962 to 2012 subject to data availability in figure 5. The 
17
rationale here is that a bigger non-oil exports relative to all exports including oil would imply 
a much more diversified and petroleum independent export structure.  
We draw exports data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, 
which is a collaboration between the World Bank and the UNCOMTRADE database of the 
United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The export data covers 
133 countries in total however here we focus on 35 oil exporting countries. We select data at 
the 1-digit level of aggregation from the SITC Revision 1 which contains the main 10 trade 
sectors. These 10 trade sectors are food and live animals; beverages and tobacco; crude 
materials, inedible except fuel; mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; animal and 
vegetable oils and fats; chemicals; manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; 
machinery and transport equipment; miscellaneous manufactured articles; and commodities 
and transactions not classified. To compute non-oil exports, we deduct the value of ‘mineral 
fuels, lubricants and related materials’ exports from the aggregate. Values in the WITS 
dataset are reported in constant 1000 USD with base year 2000. In other words, export 
volume is evaluated at 2000 constant price. Therefore, any changes in the value of trade 
reflects a real change and not nominal fluctuations associated with short term price 
movements. Moreover, as we compute non-oil exports as shares of total exports, we 
effectively evaluate the quantity share at the year 2000 relative price. The WITS data values 
are consistent over the years and did not need any adjustment.  
We notice that there is quite a diversity of patterns when it comes to the share of non-
oil exports to total exports. We observe steady improvements in non-oil exports share in the 
MENA countries especially during the post 1980 period of the new era of globalization. 
These countries include Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Iraq and 
Kuwait appear to be exceptions in this region with both countries experiencing a significant 
drop in non-oil export share post 1990. The case of Iraq is perhaps partly explained by 
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adverse international relations shock in the form of UN Security Council approved sanctions, 
subsequent foreign invasion and military conflict.  
In contrast, oil producing countries from the former USSR (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia) exhibit steady decline in the share of non-oil exports in the 1990s. However, this 
decline appears to have slowed down 2005 onwards in all three countries. The initial rapid 
decline in the 1990s post disintegration of USSR could partly be explained by the loss of 
industrial capacity during this period. Industrial production in the USSR was heavily reliant 
on the value chain network of raw materials, parts and components, and assembly spread over 
multiple constituent republics based on cost advantages and economies of scale. 
Disintegration of USSR severed these networks and also caused significant loss of market for 
these firms. As a result these countries witnessed a decline in high value goods production 
relative to the production of raw materials.  
To our surprise, the pattern in high income countries appear to be somewhat similar to 
the countries from the former USSR. Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, UK, and USA all 
exhibit a steady decline in non-oil exports share post 1980. This is perhaps reflective of the 
deindustrialization experienced by these countries during the age of globalization. Norway 
and Australia appears to be exceptions perhaps reflecting their strength as exporters of food 
and agro processed products. 
The trend in Sub-Saharan Africa is of export concentration and deindustrialization. 
Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria all experience rapid fall in non-oil exports 
relative to total exports in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. These are lost decades for Africa 
when initial attempts towards industrialization through big push were reversed. The Ghanaian 
case however is somewhat different from the others as she witnesses a decline post 2000. 
This is consistent with the fact that Ghana became a major oil producer only in the last 
decade.       
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Finally, the experiences of oil exporting countries in South East Asia and Latin 
America appears to be mixed. Oil export dependency increases in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela whereas the opposite takes place in Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
Vietnam.  The diversification success of the latter could be explained by these countries 
ability to enter global production networks through trade deals and favorable geography. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam perhaps benefitted and continue to benefit from their 
proximity to a China led production network in spite of negative Dutch Disease effects from 
petroleum exports. The Mexican success story is perhaps partly explained by the effects of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
It is entirely possible that large countries do not export much to the outside world due 
to relatively bigger size of their internal market. Therefore, solely focusing on exports may 
not present us with a complete picture of the state of diversification. Ideally one would also 
need to examine the internal structure of the economy.  
In figure 6 we focus on the state of the labor market. We plot non-oil private sector 
employment as a share of total employment in 27 oil exporting countries covering the period 
1969 to 2008. We focus on non-oil private sector employment as opposed to all non-oil 
employment because a significant proportion of non-oil public sector employment are likely 
to dependent on the oil revenue. Therefore, including non-oil public sector employment 
might create a pseudo impression of diversification which could easily be reversed in the 
event of an adverse oil price shock.  
We draw sectoral employment data are from the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). ILO data covers 127 countries and includes all economic activities at the 1-digit level 
between 1969 and 2008. Here, we only exploit data from 27 oil exporting countries. The ILO 
dataset reports employment under different classifications. Some countries use the ISIC-
revision 2, others moved to ISIC-revisions 3 and 4 in recent years, and some are using their 
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own national classification. We harmonize more disaggregated employment data from 
ISICrev3 and ISICrev4 to ISICrev2 by following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Timmer and de 
Vries (2008) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011). If a country reports two revisions, we use the 
earlier revision. Official estimates are preferred over labor surveys and data not complying 
with ISIC conventions are dropped. Table 1 shows the concordance between ISICrev3 and 
ISICrev2. 
As we have mentioned earlier, employment data from the ILO suffers from several 
shortcomings. Lack of developing country coverage and missing values often bring in serious 
challenges. Furthermore, ILO employment data sometimes have sudden big fluctuations in 
the numbers reported under certain sectors. This could be due to countries sometimes 
changing their calculation method even under the same classification/revision. We take this 
into consideration by dropping such observations from the sample by making the data more 
comparable. However, we do compromise data coverage by using this strategy. Nevertheless, 
we try to make the best of what we have in figure 6.  
We observe that the non-oil private sector employment shares in some of the MENA 
countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Libya declined. However an upward trend is observed in 
Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. These trends offer some direction but 
one would need to be careful in interpreting these trends as employment data from MENA 
countries are not of highest quality.  
Among the former Soviet bloc countries, Azerbaijan exhibits greater oil dependency 
in the labor market whereas there is evidence of growth in non-oil private sector employment 
in both Kazakhstan and Russia. This is consistent with the fact that both of these countries 
experienced expansion in industrial output post 2000.  
Oil exporting high income countries such as Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, UK, and USA experienced a relative decline in non-oil private sector employment. 
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This is perhaps partly explained by the expansion in public sector employment in these 
countries (particularly Australia, the Netherlands, UK, and USA) over the last two decades 
coupled with rapid expansion of the financial services industries. Even though the share of 
the financial services industries have increased rapidly over this period their employment 
contribution remained fairly modest. In contrast, credit fueled property boom in these 
countries contributed to the expansion of employment in local government. Canada appears 
to be an exception to this common trend where the share of non-oil private sector 
employment remained steady during 1980 to 2008. 
Labor market trends in Latin America and East Asia appears to be mixed with some 
countries making significant gains (Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico) while 
others losing out (Venezuela, Vietnam).  
In summary the employment trends appear to be mixed. The employment trends are 
perhaps better indicators of diversification for large countries with bigger internal markets 
and who tend to engage less in international trade. For small and medium sized countries, 
export based measures are better indicators as they are more likely to be outward oriented due 
to the relatively small size of their internal market. The caveat however is that the data used is 
of reasonable quality. 
Hausmann et al. (2005) and Freund and Pierola (2012) argue that observing sustained 
periods of economic performance is more meaningful than short term fluctuations in 
economic data. There is merit in their argument and hence we look at diversification over 10 
year periods and plot summary statistics of these diversification spells. In particular, in figure 
7 we plot the decadal growth rates of the share of non-oil exports. A rising trend over a 
decade would indicate diversification whereas a declining trend would signify concentration. 
The high income oil exporters such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, and 
USA experience concentration. However, drawing a conclusion that this is solely due to oil 
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exports is problematic. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) document that high income countries 
specialize beyond a certain threshold level of income. What we observe in figure 7 is 
perfectly compatible with their observation. 
In figure 8 we are only able to plot decadal growth rates of non-oil employment share 
for 10 countries due to data constraints. Note that the decadal growth rates in Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, and USA are negative indicating a gradual 
concentration in the labor market but at a slower pace.    
In figure 9 we plot the change in non-oil export share over the period 2000 to 2012 
against several macroeconomic policy and institutional variables. We find that real exchange 
rate overvaluation do not seem to hinder non-oil exports relative to other exports during the 
last decade. The positive association between non-oil exports and institutional quality is quite 
strong implying countries with growing non-oil export sectors are likely to have better quality 
institutions. Oil dependent countries are also likely to be heavy subsidizers of the local fuel 
market. Hence, we plot local gasoline prices against the change in non-oil exports. We find 
that less reliance on oil exports is also correlated with less fuel subsidy and higher energy 
price. Finally, we also plot oil rent per capita against the change in non-oil exports share and 
as expected find a negative association.  
In summary, we observe statistical association between macroeconomic policy or 
institutions variables and non-oil exports. However, the direction of causality remains an 
open question. 
The real exchange rate, energy price, and oil rent per capita data are sourced from the 
World Bank whereas the Polity 2 data is sourced from the Polity IV dataset. Note that the 
energy price data is the log of the pump price of gasoline and diesel fuel measured in US 
dollars per litre. The World Bank sources this data from the German Agency for International 
Cooperation.  
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Finally, we correlate the diversification measures with measures of oil dependence in 
a regression model. The idea here is that the oil dependence variable would capture Dutch 
Disease leaving the effect of policy and other factors hidden in the residuals. We use a panel 
dataset covering up to 35 countries observed over the period 1962 to 2012 for the exports 
based indicator and up to 27 countries observed over the period 1969 to 2008 for the 
employment based indicator. To correlate oil dependence with diversification we estimate the 
following model. 
1= Reit i t it itDiv Oil nt                                         (1) 
 where it jDiv   is the outcome variable (natural log of the share of non-oil exports or natural 
log of the share of non-oil private sector employment) in country i  and year t , i  is a 
country dummy variable accounting for country fixed effects, t  is a year dummy variable 
controlling for time varying common shocks. In order to further constrain the specification 
we replace t  by country specific trends which is a stronger control.   
We expect the coefficient 1  to be negative and statistically significant implying 
higher oil dependency associated with smaller share of non-oil exports and non-oil private 
sector employment. The estimated coefficient could be interpreted as elasticity as both the 
dependent and independent variables are measured in logs.  
The oil rent variable Re itOil nt  is the natural log of rent per capita from oil and gas 
and expressed in 2010 constant US dollars. The data is derived from the World Banks 
adjusted net savings database. Rent from petroleum is defined as the difference between its 
world price and the average extraction cost. World price of petroleum is global and it only 
varies over time. The extraction cost however is variable over time and across countries. We 
calculate total rents accruing from oil by multiplying the rent per unit of output by the total 
volume extracted.  
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In table 2 column 1 we find strong negative correlation between oil rent and the share 
of non-oil exports to total exports. In column 2 we add stronger controls in the form of 
country and year fixed effects. The country fixed effects control for country specific time 
invariant factors such as geography and the year dummies control for common international 
shocks. We observe that the size of the elasticity declines to 20 percent. However, this drop 
appears to be reversed in column 3 when we replace the year dummy by a stronger control in 
the form of country specific trends.  
The R2 in the full model is approximately 80 percent suggesting that the majority of 
the variation in export diversification in oil exporting countries are explained by Dutch 
Disease, geography, and global shocks. 
In columns 4  6 we perform the same experiment with the share of non-oil private 
sector employment as the dependent variable. The results are similar except that the 
magnitude of the elasticity declines in column 6 and loses statistical significance. The 
negative sign however survives. We also notice that non-oil exports are far more sensitive to 
oil rent than non-oil private sector employment as is revealed by the magnitude of the 
estimated elasticities.  
In our regressions, countries such as Angola, Brunei, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE typically have large residuals when non-oil exports were used 
as a dependent variable. This perhaps signals significant room for policy. Among the high 
income oil exporters, Denmark, Norway and United Kingdom have higher residuals 
highlighting policy space in these countries to improve their export diversification levels. 
The non-oil employment residual plot exposes similar patterns as the non-oil exports 
residual plot. The MENA countries identified above also shows patterns of large residuals 
with the employment data along with Malaysia and Algeria but to a much lesser extent.   
5 Oil and Diversification: A Research Agenda
25
So far we have discussed the literature on diversification and presented a descriptive 
summary of the data. In this section we identify some gaps in the literature and map out a 
research agenda for the future. We propose the following eight areas that could help address 
the gaps and move the literature forward.  
1. Hydrocarbons and Gender Specific Diversification 
Ross (2008) argues that oil production could lead to gender skewed labour market outcomes 
in many oil producing countries. The study postulates that oil production reduces the number 
of women in the labor force through multiple channels. First, a rise in oil production leads to 
a drop in tradable goods production through the Dutch Disease mechanism. This in turn 
reduces the demand for female workers which depresses female wages. Low wages acts as a 
disincentive towards female workforce participation. Second, a rise in oil production 
increases male wages and government transfers which acts as a further disincentive towards 
female workforce participation. Low workforce participation by women reduces their 
political power and in¯uence. As a result, oil-producing states are more likely to be left with 
atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions. 
This is indeed a strong thesis and the study finds support for it by correlating oil 
production with female employment and female political rights. A worthy exercise but a 
thesis of this significance merits further investigation. It could very well be that oil 
disproportionately affects female dominated professions and thereby making the female labor 
market more concentrated. Therefore a systematic analysis of the impact of oil on the 
employment diversification of women relative to men would be useful. Furthermore, we 
currently have very little knowledge of the impact of hydrocarbons on female labor 
productivity and female manufacturing employment. Female manufacturing employment is 
an indicator of how much stake women have in a shared and diversified economy as a vibrant 
manufacturing sector seems to be one of the preconditions for a diversified economy. 
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Therefore, analyzing the impact of oil on female manufacturing employment has broader 
significance.  
2. Petroleum, Infrastructure Investments and Economic Diversification 
The policy literature often highlights the importance of infrastructure and especially energy 
infrastructure in attaining economic progress and a diversified economy. However, we have 
very little knowledge of the role that infrastructure and especially energy infrastructure plays 
in energy rich states. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to highlights the strength, 
weakness, bottlenecks, and constraints associated with infrastructure in energy rich states.  
There are several potentially important specific questions/issues that remain 
unaddressed. We list them as follows. First, the literature needs to dig deep into the types of 
infrastructure investment that could potentially be beneficial for energy rich countries. In 
many energy rich developing countries, the energy infrastructure is geared towards exports 
rather than local consumption and electricity generation. For example, a country rich in 
natural gas could make substantial investments in setting up LNG terminals for exports. 
Alternatively, it could also invest in power plants to bolster natural gas fired electricity 
generation for local consumption. There is hardly any analysis of the merits and limitations of 
such policy choice in the context of diversification. Second, it is also important to map out 
the potential country specific costs and infrastructure bottlenecks associated with 
diversification. Generating internationally comparable new data could be very useful here. 
Furthermore, one needs to ask the question how useful is it to invest in electricity 
infrastructure during oil booms and what are the long term effects of such investments? Do 
electricity prices play a role in influencing the long term effects? How important is the 
interconnection between hydrocarbons, electricity prices and diversification in the long run? 
Can we analyze the location specific effects of energy infrastructure investments and 
electricity provision on economic activity and diversification using project level geocoded 
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datasets? Addressing these questions could go a long way in understanding the infrastructure 
investment challenges faced by oil rich developing countries.  
3. Hydrocarbon, Trade Networks and the Road to Economic Diversification 
Yeats (1998) and Yi (2003) document that the trade in parts and components (otherwise 
known as global production sharing) has grown at a much faster rate than total world trade in 
merchandise over the last three decades. The current growth success stories of South East 
Asia in underpinned by the successful exploitation of these trade networks by these countries. 
Therefore, any viable diversification strategy for an energy rich state based on 
industrialization and sustainable development should include effective participation in the 
global production sharing network.  
Being energy rich could potentially be a strength or a weakness in terms of breaking 
into the global production sharing network. For example, energy riches could be exploited to 
generate cheap electricity and attract foreign investment in key energy intensive tasks and 
components at different stages of production. This could potentially kick start the process of 
skill renewal, learning by doing, and diversified economic progress. In contrast, energy riches 
could also trigger extreme specialization relegating the energy rich country to a mere supplier 
of raw materials. In spite of the importance of global production sharing in economic 
development and diversification we know very little of it in the context of oil rich countries. 
There is very little research on the risks and possibilities for an energy rich economy in 
participating in the global production sharing network. To make progress on the policy front 
this obviously ought to change.  
4. Oil, Outward Oriented Employment and Economic Diversification 
Modern oil extraction is extremely capital intensive. Therefore, it generates little direct 
employment. Therefore, any viable diversification strategy for oil rich nations ultimately 
boils down to developing a sustainable non-oil private sector able to generate large volumes 
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of employment; a point that we have made earlier in the paper. For an oil rich developing 
country however, this challenge is somewhat more complex. Given that the internal market 
for these countries are likely to be small, therefore it is unlikely that such a small sized 
market would be able to generate the big push required for the development of the non-oil 
private sector. Hence, outward orientation of the economy is extremely important.  
Given the significance of outward orientation and globalization, it is important to 
keep stock of the size of outward oriented employment in oil producing countries. How 
export oriented employment get affected in the event of price, production, and discovery 
shocks in the oil industry? Is this form of employment less volatile than other forms of 
employment (for example, public sector employment) in the event of an adverse shock? We 
recognize building such disaggregated employment data would be a challenge. However, 
there is some progress made on that front in the form of labor content of exports database 
(LACEX) from the World Bank which could be improved upon.  
5. Hydrocarbons, Investment Quality and Diversification 
Investments in oil rich developing countries are often characterized by poor quality. This is 
particularly true for infrastructure investments but is also relevant for other forms of 
investments. The profession and the policy community is well aware of these challenges and 
often point to corruption, bad governance, lack of skilled workforce as contributing factors.  
In spite of the widespread awareness of these issues, there is very little objective 
analysis of the challenges faced by these countries. In particular, there is very little data on 
the quality of investments. An innovative research program would make a serious attempt 
towards quantifying investment quality across countries. A way forward would be to utilize 
geocoded data of private investment to evaluate its location characteristics, rental value, and 
gestation period. Development of a composite index based on these and other parameters 
would go a long way in objectively analyzing investment quality and its effects on 
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diversification in hydrocarbon rich countries.  
In addition to analyzing private investment quality, there is also a need to assess the 
quality of public investments. The Public Investments Management Index (PIMI) is a step in 
the right direction but there is an urgent need to extend this metric to the project level so that 
researcher could have access to more disaggregated information on investment quality in oil 
rich countries.   
6. Hydrocarbons and the Role of Institutions in Diversification 
Institutions are identified as a key determinant of economic progress. The literature on long 
term economic progress and other areas of social science emphasize the importance of 
institutions in numerous publications. Yet very little is known on the impact of institutions on 
industrialization and diversification. Beyond the economic mechanism of Dutch Disease 
there is a good reason to believe that politics and political institutions alter the incentives for 
the ruling elite to adopt policies to diversify the economy. This is of particular significance 
for an oil rich country (or for that matter any other society) since resource endowment often 
guides the nature of the tax system, political system and public policy in general. Many 
studies have identified that these incentives for the incumbent elite in an oil rich country are 
markedly different from an oil poor country. Furthermore, surprisingly little is known about 
the role of individuals in these societies. For example, Mahathir in Malaysia or Lee Kwan Yu 
in Singapore or General Park in South Korea are often portrayed as reformers and 
modernizers who significantly influenced the process of industrialization in their countries as 
leaders. Suhartos role in Indonesia could be viewed as similar to the others but his share of 
Indonesian history remains controversial. 
A research program on diversification in energy rich countries should include a 
systematic study of the impact of institutions on diversification outcomes. Needless to say 
that the role of the leader merits special attention and so is the role of political institutions.  
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7. Oil and Policy towards Diversification 
As we have documented in section 2, there is a large policy literature on diversification. We 
recognize the importance of this research and the value of having country case studies 
alongside empirically focused comparative studies. However, this literature is somewhat 
disorganized and haphazard. Therefore, there is demand for research outlining the policy 
space to achieve diversification. In section 2 we highlighted the importance of prudent 
macroeconomic policy. We also highlighted the importance of a moderately tight monetary 
policy and fiscal policy coupled with improving the business climate could go a long way in 
ensuring price stability and promoting savings, investments, and exports led sustainable 
growth as opposed to growth led by unsustainable consumption demand. However, beyond 
our knowledge of macroeconomic policy, the policy space is not very specific on concrete 
practical measures that petroleum rich countries could undertake to achieve diversification. 
For instance, what could oil rich countries do to penetrate global production networks? What 
are the merits of having a coherent electricity policy in the event a country is energy rich but 
infrastructure poor?   
Mapping the policy space and creating a consolidated database could be useful. 
Furthermore, visualization of diversification oriented policy data could be of value to both 
practitioners and researchers.  
8. Improving Data Quality and Coverage 
In section 3 we made the argument that limitations associated with data quality and coverage 
severely handicaps research on diversification. Therefore improving the data quality and 
coverage is of utmost priority when it comes to research on diversification. The data from the 
World Bank and WITS primarily used to compute measures of export diversification are of 
reasonable quality and both coverage and quality have improved over the years. However 
there is still more room for improvement on that from as it only covers 122 countries. For 
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many countries the number of data points offered are extremely limited.  
The quality of employment data predominantly derived from the ILO database 
remains significantly poor. There is scope for improving both the quality and coverage of 
disaggregated labor market data across countries. Disaggregated labor productivity data could 
be computed from UNIDO sources which has far better coverage than ILO. However the data 
is only restricted to manufacturing.  
There is also demand for sectoral GDP data across countries. The University of 
Groningen project does a good job in compiling a database for predominantly OECD 
countries. McMillan and Rodrik (2014) extends this dataset to 10 African countries which is 
an advancement. However, significant improvements could be made in utilizing 
administrative data from many other countries to extend this database even further. This 
could be achieved provided such research programs are properly resourced. 
6 Concluding Remarks
Diversifications remains a key policy agenda for many petroleum rich countries. Yet 
surprisingly little is known about the merits of diversification in these locations. In this paper 
we review recent studies of diversification in oil-exporting states. We map the data 
limitations and highlight the challenges facing the oil-exporting countries by mapping the 
diversification pathways of the worlds 35 oil exporters. We track their non-oil export shares 
over the period 1962 to 2012. We also track the non-oil private sector employment share over 
the period 1969 to 2008. To track sustained period of diversification or the lack of we look at 
diversification over 10 year periods and offer summary statistics of these diversification 
spells. Finally, we also employ plots and a simple regression model that correlates non-oil 
exports and employment with resource rent and geography. The intention here is to identify 
any room for policy maneuvers.  
We find diverse patterns in the data when it comes to diversification. Therefore, the 
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challenges for different countries and regions are likely to be different. We find strong 
negative correlation between oil dependency and diversification even after controlling for 
country specific unobserved heterogeneity such as geography, country specific trends such as 
culture and demographic factors, time varying global shocks, and cross-sectional dependence. 
A closer look at the residuals indicate that MENA and Sub-Saharan African countries have 
more room for policy maneuvers when it comes to diversification. 
We do not claim that our empirical approach presented here is superior to the 
approaches taken by others in the literature. Nor do we argue that the indicators of 
diversification used by us here is free from limitations that we documented in section 3 of the 
paper. We do however take stock and lay out a detailed research plan in order to take this 
important literature forward. 
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Figure 1: Missing Values in Oil Countries 
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Note: The figure plots the number of missing values for oil countries against log oil rents per capita in the WITS, UNIDO and ILO datasets over 
the period 1962-2012. Source: WITS, UNIDO, and ILO. 
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Figure 2: Missing Values in All Countries 
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Note: The figure plots the number of missing values for all countries against log oil rents per capita in the WITS, UNIDO and ILO datasets over 
the period 1962-2012. Source: WITS, UNIDO, and ILO. 
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Figure 3: Oil Export Share and Oil Price
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Note: The figure plots oil export share averaged over all oil exporting countries and oil price over the period 
1962-2012. Source: WITS for oil export share and BP oil price dataset for oil price. 
Figure 4: Complexity Index and Oil Price
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Note: The figure plots complexity index averaged over all OPEC countries and oil price over the period 1995-
2012. Source: Complexity Index from Hausmann et al. (2014) and BP oil price dataset for oil price. 
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Figure 5: Non-Oil Exports as a Share of Total Exports in Oil Countries
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Figure 6: Non-Oil Private Sector Employment as a Share of Total Employment in Oil Countries
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Figure 7: Decadal Growth in Non-Oil Exports Share in Oil Countries
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Note: Decadal growth rate of the Non-Oil exports share of total exports plotted over the period 1970-2010 subject to data availability for 27 oil 
exporting countries. Source: The World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) and UN Comtrade database, the United Nations. 
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Figure 8: Decadal Growth in Non-Oil Private Sector Employment Share in Oil Countries
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Note: Decadal growth in Non-Oil private sector employment share plotted over the period 1970-2010 subject to data availability for 10 oil 
exporting countries. Source: International Labour Organization (ILO). 
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Figure 9: Macroeconomic Policy and Change in Non-Oil Export Share
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Table 1: different classifications between ISIC revisions 2 and 3 
ISIC-Revision 2  ISIC-Revision 3 Equivalent 
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
A. Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 
B. Fishing 
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and 
Restaurants and Hotels 
G. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and 
Personal and Household Goods 
H. Hotels and Restaurants 
8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 
J. Financial Intermediation 
K. Real Estate, Renting and Business 
Activities 
9. Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
L. Public Administration and Defense; 
Compulsory Social Security 
M. Education 
N. Health and Social Work 
O. Other Community, Social and 
Personal Service Activities 
P. Households with Employed Persons 
Note: McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and Timmer and de Vries (2008) follows this harmonization procedure 
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TABLE 2. 
OIL RENT AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
 Non-Oil Exports Non-Oil Exports Non-Oil Exports Non-Oil Pvt.Emp. Non-Oil Pvt.Emp. Non-Oil Pvt.Emp.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Oil Rent -0.34*** 
(0.04) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
-0.38*** 
(0.02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
Controls 
Country Fixed Effects NO YES NO  NO YES NO 
Year Fixed Effects, NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Country Specific Trends NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
R2 0.26 0.85 0.83 0.06 0.90 0.88 
Observations 1007 1007 1007 599 599 599 
Countries 35 35 35 27 27 27 
Year 1962-2012 1962-2012 1962-2012 1969-2008 1969-2008 1969-2008 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, 
arbitrary intra-group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. Non-Oil Exports:natural log of non-oil exports as a share of total exports.Non-Oil
Pvt.Emp:naturallogofnon-oilprivatesectoremploymentasashareoftotalemployment.OilRent:naturallogofoilrentpercapita. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
